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Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium model to quantitatively
explain high labor share, low productivity and small farm size in agri-
culture in low income countries. The model features individual het-
erogeneity in skill that is augmentable over time and endogenous oc-
cupation choice. Calibrated to the U.S, the model can reproduce bulk
of the observed variations in agriculture employment, agriculture out-
put per worker and mean farm size across countries in the sample. In
addition, the model generates endogenous farm size distributions that
closely resemble the empirical counterpart for a large set of countries.
Counterfactual exercises show TFP to be the main source of produc-
tivity differences.
JEL Classification: O11, O13, O41
Keywords : Income differences, agricultural productivity, Skill invest-
ment, farm size distribution.
∗Email: wenbiao-cai@uiowa.edu. I thank B.Ravikumar for continuous encouragement
and guidance. I benefit from conversations with Hari Govindan, Guillaume Vanden-
broucke, Gustavo Ventura and seminar participants at the University of Iowa, and the
Alumni Workshop 2010.
1
1 Introduction
Income and living standard vary substantially across countries. Under-
standing the origin of income differences have been the central question
in economic development. While many studies have focus on productivity
differences at the aggregate level, several recent studies have shown that
productivity differences are asymmetric across different sectors (see Caselli
[2005], Restuccia et al. [2008], Herrendorf and Valentinyi [2005], among oth-
ers). Using PPP adjusted output measures, Restuccia et al. [2008] shows the
poorest 10% countries from the world income distribution on average em-
ploys 85% of their labor in agriculture. On per-worker term, these countries
only manage to produce less than 2% of the output produced in the richest
10% countries, where agriculture on average employs less than 5% of the la-
bor force. In sharp contrast, outside the agriculture sector, the poorest 10%
countries appear to be almost as productive as the richest 10% countries.
Low living standard is thus characterized by high employment in an ex-
tremely unproductive traditional sector. The central economic development
question is to ask why most people in poor countries work in a dispropor-
tionately unproductive sector? Understanding this question is important
to understand aggregate income differences. A counterfactual calculation
similar to the one in Caselli [2005] will illustrate this point succinctly. If all
countries would have the U.S. agriculture productivity, and maintain their
own labor allocation and nonagriculture productivity, cross-country income
differences would almost disappear! A less ambitious experiment, where all
countries have the U.S. relative productivity (agriculture/nonagriculture),
while maintaining their own labor share and nonagriculture productivity,
indicates that the income differences would shrink to a factor of 6, from a
factor of 32, between the richest 10% and the poorest 10% countries.
Using data from World Census of Agriculture (WCA 1990, 2000), I doc-
ument a new set of empirical observations regarding agriculture production
across countries, namely, the scale of production positively correlates with
levels of development. Here, scale of production is measured by the size
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of the plot1. Figure 1 (left) plots the logarithm of mean farm size (MFS)
against real GDP per worker relative to the U.S. A clear positive trend
emerges from the picture. As income rises, the mean farm size increases2.
Moreover, in low income countries, agriculture production concentrates dis-
proportionately in very small farms. Figure 1 (right) plots the size distribu-
tion for a set of representative countries. 3 In Ethiopia, 90% of the farms
are less than 5 hectares. In contrast, 50% of the farms in the U.S. span over
land that is 50 hectares or larger.
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Figure 1: Size of Farms Across Levels of Development
Heterogeneity in farm size has important implications about productiv-
ity in agriculture. From 2007 U.S. Census of Agriculture, I compute the
sales per worker and value added per worker4 for farms of different size
1In WCA, the unit of observation is “holding”, which by definition is “an economic unit
of agricultural production under single management comprising all livestock kept and all
land used wholly or partly for agricultural production purposes, without regard to title,
legal form, or size. Single management may be exercised by an individual or household,
jointly by two or more individuals or households, by a clan or tribe, or by a juridical
person such as a corporation, cooperative or government agency”.
2Larger size of a country does not necessarily imply higher MFS. Fox example, New
Zealand is only about 1/40 as large as the U.S., yet its MFS is about 1.5 times that of the
U.S..
3In the sample rich countries include U.S, Canada, UK and Australia. Poor countries
include Uganda, Guinea, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso.
4Worker include both farm operator and hired worker
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scales. The results are summarized in Figure 2. A typical farm in the
largest scale class on average produce produce 16 times more output per
worker than a typical farm in the smallest scale5. In value added terms, the
productivity differences are even larger. Even though large farms tend to
be more capital intensive, using reasonable factor shares, the productivity
differences can not be fully explained by differences in capital stock across
farms. Computed Solow residual is about 6-8 times higher in the largest
farms, relative to the smallest ones. Data on productivity measures by size
of a farm are not readily available for other countries, especially low income
countries. However, several studies do find a similar relation between size
and labor productivity for developing countries.Fan and Chan-Kang [2005]
found a positive relationship between size and labor productivity for a set
of asian countries. Byiringiroa and Reardon [1996] draw similar conclusion
for farms in Rwanda.
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Figure 2: Productivity by Size of Farm (U.S)
How much of the productivity differences in agriculture can be explained
by observed heterogeneity in scale of production, given the observed size-
productivity regularity in the U.S. This is, of course, a valid development
accounting question. To answer the question, I first estimate a log-linear
function between productivity and mean farm size, and also between hired
5Similar results are obtained in earlier census (92, 97 and 02). Historical census also
shows an increasing productivity gap between small and large farms. A 1000-acre farm
appears no more productive than a 50-care farm in 1945.
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labor and mean farm size, using U.S. census data. Taking the estimates
as given, for each of the country I compute the implied productivity from
the observed farm size distribution. Detailed calculations are given in ap-
pendix section 5.2. For a sample of 40 countries with complete data, the size
heterogeneity along can explain about 30% of the variation in agriculture
productivity across countries. Apparently, size differences are important to
understand productivity differences. The natural development question is,
of course, why farms are predominantly small in low income countries? A
list of possible candidates can be tabulated, for example, barriers to capi-
tal for large scale of operation, institutional restriction on land acquisition
and even geographical disadvantages. In this paper, I view the farm size
heterogeneity as reflecting the skills of individual working in the agriculture
sector. This idea traces back to Lucas’ celebrated span of control model,
where scale of production is tied to the skills of manager. This interpretation
of cross-section size heterogeneity has support from U.S. data. U.S. Census
of Agriculture reports the average size of holding of operators, whose pri-
mary occupation is farming. Interestingly, holding size exhibit substantial
variation over operators of different age. Table 1 summarizes this pattern
in 2007 census.
Age 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Mean Size 575 857 909 736 542
Table 1: Mean Holding Size by Age of Operator
The size profile exhibits a hump-shape, which is a well-known feature
of life-cycle earning profile in income dynamics. Moreover, census data also
indicates that younger operators spend more time off the farm than older
operators. These observations suggest other factors, other than institu-
tional restrictions and barriers, affect the average size of a farm. Moreover,
these factors are most likely idiosyncratic and reflect characteristics of farm
operators. An reasonable conjecture, in the same spirit of human capital
accumulation, is that younger operators spend time augmenting their skills
and hence expand their scale of operation overtime. The skill interpretation
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is thus consistent with the cross-section data on farm size across countries
and across operators of different ages in the U.S.
The main contribution of this paper is to quantitatively explain agricul-
ture labor share and productivity differences by appealing to differences in
scale of production in agriculture. The model also generates endogenously
farm size distributions that closely resemble empirical counterpart, and thus
provides good discipline on model mechanism. The model features individ-
ual heterogeneity and endogenous occupation choices. Within the model,
countries differ in their levels of aggregate, sector-neutral TFP. Individuals
are heterogenous in initial skill type, and chooses occupation between worker
and farm operator. Skill investment is incorporated into a version of Lucas’
span-of-control model to endogenously generate s farm size distribution. In
high TFP countries, wage rate is high and thus only high skill individuals
will choose to operate a farm. As a result, farmers operate a larger farm
and measured labor productivity is higher in these countries. The oppo-
site is true in low TFP countries. The main mechanisms in the model are
nonhomothetic preferences and skill accumulation. The former implies low
income countries will have higher price of agriculture good, which renders
farm operator a more attractive occupation. More people, even those with
low skill, choose to work in the agriculture sector. The latter creates an
additional avenue of productivity differences. The model is calibrated to
reproduce some key moments and the observed size distribution of farms in
the U.S. For a sample of 40 countries, the parameterized model is able to
explain bulk of the cross-section labor allocations, sector productivity and
farm size distributions.
Following the work by Hall and Jones [1999], many studies have been
devoted to uncover the origin of income differences across countries. Us-
ing development accounting techniques, Chanda and Dalgaard [2008] show
relative productivity across agriculture and nonagriculture sector are im-
portant determinant of aggregate productivity. Crdoba and Ripoll [2005]
show that differences in human capital between rural and urban workers
explain bulk of differences in aggregate productivity. Vollrath [2009] shows
that misallocations of factors of production go far in explaining aggregate
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productivity differences. Looking at the agriculture sector only, Vollrath
[2007] shows that inequality in land ownership is important to agriculture
productivity, using an econometric model. This paper differs from the stud-
ies above in using a general equilibrium model. This paper is closely to
related to a strand of literature that models explicitly an agriculture sec-
tor in a general equilibrium model. Restuccia et al. [2008] argue that dis-
tortion in intermediate inputs causes low agricultural productivity in de-
veloping countries. Gollin et al. [2004] argues low agriculture productivity
in poor countries is due to unmeasured home production. These papers
assume representative agents, while in this paper individual heterogeneity
is important to productivity differences. This paper is closely related to
Waugh and Lagakos [2009]. In their paper, low agriculture productivity is
due to poor specialization. Facing subsistence, individual work in agricul-
ture in which they do not have comparative advantage. This paper examines
the scale of production in determining productivity differences, which their
paper abstracts from. This paper is most closely related to a recent study
by Restuccia and Adamopoulos [2009]. Both papers focus on scale of pro-
duction in agriculture as an determinant of productivity, using a Lucas’s
span-of-control framework. However, this studies differs from theirs in two
key dimensions. Firstly, this paper models explicitly occupation choices by
heterogeneous individuals. Instead, they focus on the time allocation be-
tween sectoral production from a representative household’s point of view.
Secondly, this paper also explores the avenue of skill accumulation in deter-
mining the cross-country variation in farm size and agriculture productivity,
which is abstracted from in their paper. I thus view this study as comple-
mentary to theirs. In the respect of modeling occupation choice using a
framework of Lucas’ span of control model, this paper is similar to Gollin
[2007], who explores the secular decline in share of entrepreneur with rising
income.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In
section 3 I calibrate the model and discuss the results. Finally section 4
presents the conclusion remark.
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2 Model
2.1 Environment
The economy is populated with a continuum of individuals who live for T
periods. Size of each cohort is normalized to be 1. There is no lifetime
uncertainty and no growth in population. Total mass of individuals in the
economy at a point of time is T. When born, individuals obtain a draw of
their skill type, denoted by z. Draws are i.i.d across individuals and over
time. Each individual is endowed with one unit of physical time. Individuals
have identical non-homothetic preferences as represented by the following
utility function
U(ca, cn) = η · log(ca − a¯) + (1− η) · log(cn)
(ca, cn) denote, respectively, agriculture consumption good and nonagricul-
ture consumption good. η reflects the relative taste between two consump-
tion goods. a¯ is the subsistence level of agriculture consumption. a¯ ≥ 0
implies a income elasticity of agriculture consumption less than unity. As a
result, expenditure share in agriculture consumption declines with income
level.
2.2 Technology
Nonagriculture output is produced with a simple linear technology
Yn = A ·Hn
Here A is TFP level, and Hn is labor in the non-agriculture sector. Without
loss of generality, I assume there is an representative nonagriculture firm in
the economy.
Agriculture output is produced using a Cobb-Douglas technology
Ya = A · z
1−γ
(
Hαa · L
1−α
)γ
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(Ha, L, z) denotes labor, land and skill, respectively. The technology exhibits
constant return to scale at the aggregate level, but decreasing return to
scale with respect to labor and land. The degree of “span-of-control”, is
summarized by parameter γ. Also note that TFP, A, enters both agriculture
and nonagriculture technology, and thus is sector-neutral.
2.3 Skill Accumulation
Individuals can augment their skill according to
zt+1 = zt + zt · s
θ
t
where st ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of time devoted to skill accumulation in period
t. Skill accumulation requires time input only. While adding resources
input can potentially strengthen model performance, I focus on time input
for analytical simplicity. I also assume that skill does not depreciate over
time. Individuals who spend st into skill accumulation, spend the remaining
fraction (1− st) into market work in period t. As a result, there is a trade-
off between current income and future income. A higher investment in
skill reduces current income because less time is devoted into market, but
increases the future ability and future income. Since skill is not fixed over
time, throughout the paper, I will identify individuals by their initial skill
draw. A type z individual refers to an individual whose initial draw of skill
is z.
2.4 Individual’s Problem
Individual, conditional on the initial draw of type, chooses an occupation to
maximize discounted lifetime utility. Since there is no leisure and individu-
als take prices as given, this problem is equivalent to the one that maximizes
discounted lifetime income. There are two occupations: worker and farm op-
erator. Worker supply labor services in exchange of market wage rate. Farm
operator hires labor and land from competitive market, in combination of
their own skill, produce output and retain residual profit. Two assumptions
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are to be elaborated here. First, occupation choice is permanent and cannot
be changed over one’s life. For a stationary equilibrium, this assumption is
harmless. Second, I assume that skill type is irrelevant for individuals who
choose worker as occupation, i.e, all workers earn the same market wage rate
regardless of their type. In equilibrium, this also implies that worker will
not devote time into skill accumulation. As a result, the discounted lifetime
income of a worker is simply
T∑
t=1
wt ·R
1−t
t
where wt is the market wage rate at time t, and Rt is the return on saving
from period t to t+1. By assumption, discounted lifetime income of workers
is independent of their type.
Farm operator’s problem is two-fold. Given (zt, st), they choose amount
of labor and land to hire as to maximize profit in period t. In addition, they
also choose time investment {st}
T
t=1 to maximize discounted lifetime income.
The optimization problem for a type z˜ farm operator can be written as
max
st
:
T∑
t=1
pi(zt(1− st)) · R
1−t
t
s.t : zt+1 = zt(1− δt) + zt · s
θ
t
z1 = z˜, st ∈ [0, 1]
Note that zt(1 − st) is the measure of skills that an farm operator devotes
to production. pi(z) is the maximized profit function that solves
max
x,ha,`
: p · A · z1−γ
(
hαa `
1−α
)
− w · ha − q · `
where p is the price of agriculture output relative to nonagriculture output.
Throughout the paper, nonagriculture output is used as nume´raire.
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2.5 Nonagriculture Firm’s Optimization
Nonagriculture firm chooses labor to maximize profit
max
Hn
A ·Hn − w ·Hn
first order condition implies w = A, i.e., the market wage rate is equal to
level of TFP.
There are competitive markets for labor and land, final consumption
goods and intertemporal loans. As a result, I can solve the income max-
imization problem first, and then given maximized discounted lifetime in-
come, solve for optimal consumption bundles. Next I define a stationary
competitive equilibrium.
2.6 Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium is collection of prices (w, p, q,R), con-
sumption and investment allocations (cat(z), cnt(z), st(z))
T
t=1, factor demand
(ha(z), `(z),Hn) such that: (1) given prices, (cat(z), cnt(z), st(z))
T
t=1 solve
individual maximization problem; (2) given prices, (ha(z), `(z)) solve farm
operator’s profit maximization problem, and Hn solve nonagriculture firm’s
profit maximization problem; (3) Prices are competitive; (4) All markets
clear.
To solve the model, I start with the income maximization problem.
Given the skill investment technology, the following result can be estab-
lished easily with the proof given in the appendix.
Lemma 1 Time investment is independent of initial type
Lemma 1 implies the slope of skill profile is the same for all operators,
regardless of their type. In addition, time investment is decreasing with
interest rate R. Let {st}
T
t=1 denote the sequence of time investments, then
skill evolves according to zt+1 = zt(1+s
θ
t ). It is convenient to define variable
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xt as follows
xt =

1, t = 1xt−1 · (1 + sθt−1), t = 2, ..., T
{xt}
T
t=1 summarizes the level of skill at time t relative to when born for
an operator. Note that since time investment is independent of initial type,
{xt} is also independent of initial type. For a type z farm operator, the
discounted lifetime income is given by
YF (z) = pi(z) ·
T∑
t=1
xt · (1− st) ·R
1−t
Since profit function pi(z) is strictly increasing in it argument, this im-
plies the lifetime discounted income is strictly increasing in initial type z.
The discounted lifetime income for a worker is simply
∑T
t=1 w · R
1−t, which
is independent of initial type. Clearly, there exists a cut-off type z¯ such
that individuals with initial type below z¯ will choose worker as occupation.
Individuals with initial type above z¯ will operate a farm. The marginal in-
dividual, hence, must be indifferent between the two occupations. To solve
for prices (p, q), I use indifference conditions for the marginal operator and
land market clearing condition.
pi(z¯) ·
T∑
t=1
xt · (1− st) ·R
1−t =
T∑
t=1
w · R1−t (1)
∫
z¯
`(z)dG(z) ·
T∑
t=1
xt · (1− st) = L¯ (2)
Equation (1) states that the marginal manager (type z¯) is indifferent
between worker and farm operator. Equation (2) states the demand of land
from all operators must be equal to land endowment L¯. Divide equation (1)
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by (2) yields an expression of land rental price
q =
[ ∑T
t=1 xt · (1− st)∑T
t=1 xt · (1− st) · R
1−t
]
·

γ · (1− α) ·
(∑T
t=1 w ·R
1−t
)
(1− γ) · L¯

 ·
∫
z¯
zdG(z)
z¯
(3)
substitute into equation (1) yields relative price of agriculture good
p =
[ ∑T
t=1 w ·R
1−t
z¯ · (1− γ) ·
∑T
t=1 xt · (1− st) · R
1−t
]1−γ
·
(
γ
(α
w
)α(1− α
q
)1−α)−γ
·
1
A
(4)
Note the relative price of agriculture output is strictly decreasing in the
cut-off type z¯ and aggregate TFP. To compute the aggregate demand of
consumption goods, I first compute the aggregate discounted income Y as
given by
Y = (1−G(z¯)) ·
T∑
t=1
w ·R1−t +
∫
z¯
YF (z)dG(z) + q¯ · L¯
T∑
t=1
R1−t (5)
Aggregate income is composed of wage income, residual profit and payment
from land. Solving optimal consumption bundles and aggregating over in-
dividuals yields aggregate demand
Ca =
T∑
t=1
cat =
[
T∑
t=1
(βR)t−1
]
·
[
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
]
·
η
p
+ T · a¯ (6)
Cn =
T∑
t=1
cnt =
[
T∑
t=1
(βR)t−1
]
·
[
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
]
· (1− η) (7)
The detail derivation of aggregate demand is given in appendix. Now
turn to the supply side. Total measure of workers working in the agriculture
sector is simply Ha =
[∑T
t=1 xt(1− st)
]
·
∫
z¯
ha(z)dG(z). Total measure of
worker is T · (1−G(z¯)), so the aggregate output in the nonagriculture sector
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is
Yn = A · (T · (1−G(z¯))−Ha)
Aggregate output in agriculture is given by
Ya =
∫
z¯
ya(z)dG(z) ·
[
T∑
t=1
xt(1− st)
]
Good markets clearing conditions requires Ca = Ya, Cn = Yn. By Wal-
ras’law, loan market clears as well.
To illustrate the model mechanics, consider two economies: rich and
poor, with TFP Ar and Ap respectively. In addition, assume that Ar/Ap =
g > 1, i.e, rich economy have higher TFP. Holding land endowment fixed,
the model predicts a lower cut-off type and a higher interest rate for the
poor economy. To see this, lets assume the two economies will have the
same cut-off type, and the same interest rate. From equation (3), it is
straight forward to see that qr = g · qp. Given this, equation (4) implies
pr = pp. These two conditions, together with equation (5), further implies
Yr = g · Yp, i.e, aggregate discounted income are proportional to aggregate
TFP. Aggregate production of agriculture good is also proportional to TFP.
However, with nonhomothetic preferences, demand of agriculture good drops
by less than a factor of g in the poor economy. This is most clearly seen from
equation (6), and thus there is excess demand in agriculture goods market.
Relative price of agriculture good has to go up, and thus induces individual
with lower type to become farm operators. The cut-off type is thus lower in
the poor country. This also reduces the supply of nonagriculture good, so
interest rate has to go up to clear the market. See Figure 3 for a pictorial
illustration.
3 Calibration and Result
In this section, I parameterize the model. Model period is 10 years. Indi-
viduals are born at the age of 25, and die at the age of 75. Total population
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at a point of time is 5. TFP for the U.S is normalized to be 1. Assum-
ing an annual discount rate of 0.96, I set β = 0.9610. To estimate income
share to operator and labor, I utilize the value added data published by
USDA, which records the value added by various factors of production at
the aggregate level. Detailed calculation are presented in appendix section
5.4. Over the period 1980-1999, the average share of income accruing to
operators is 20%. I thus set γ = 1 − 0.2 = 0.8. This value is consistent
with several existing estimates. Guner et al. [2008] estimates the span-of-
control parameter to be 0.8 for the aggregate economy. A similar value is
used inRestuccia and Rogerson [2008] for studying the effect of distortions
on aggregate productivity in an economy with heterogeneous plants. For the
manufacturing sector alone, Atkeson and Kehoe [2005] obtains an estimate
of 0.85. The share of income accruing to labor averages about 5%. For land,
the share is in a close neighborhood of 5%. I thus set α = 0.5 to match the
relative share of labor to land.
I restrict the initial type to be distributed lognormal with mean µ and
standard deviation σ. This leaves 5 parameters (a¯, η, L¯, µ, σ, θ) to be chosen
simultaneously to match moments of U.S. economy. I choose a¯ to produce
an agriculture employment share of 2% in the U.S. I choose η to generate
a long run agriculture employment share of 0.5%. This corresponds to the
asymptotic agriculture employment when subsistence consumption share of
income is zero. Parameter θ determines the time allocation between skill
investment and market work. I discipline θ using data on distribution of
working days supplied by operators of different ages. Since time investment
does not depend on initial type, operators of age i will supply the same
amount time, (1 − si), to farm work. Census of Agriculture reports the
number of days not working in the farm for operators in 5 different age
groups: 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+. Detailed calculations are given
in appendix section 5.5. Using the these data, I compute the fraction of
total working days supplied by operators from different age groups. Within
the model, this statistic corresponds to 1−si∑
i=1 T1−si
, where si is the fraction
of time devoted to skill investment for age i operator. In principle, I can
choose θ to match any of the five moments. I choose θ to reproduce the
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share of operator aged 35-44. However, the implied shares for operators in
other age groups are close to data as well, see Table 9 in appendix. Finally I
choose (L¯, µ, σ) to produce the observed size distribution of farms in the U.S.
Parameter values are summarized in Table 8 in appendix. Figure 4 plots
the calibrated size distribution against data. By construction, the model
generated size distribution matches the data. In addition, as depicted in
Figure 5 in appendix, the model also implies a land size distribution that
fits data very well, even though it is not targeted. The model also generates
a distribution of hired labor over size class that is qualitatively consistent
with data 6, although it under-predicts the share of hired labor in small
farms. One possible explanation is that elasticity of substitution between
land and labor is less than unity, e.g., larger farms substitute capital with
labor. With Cobb-Douglas technology, it is not surprising that the model
under-predicts the share of hired labor in small farms.
3.1 Quantitative Experiment
In this section I test the model’s ability to quantitatively predict the ob-
served labor allocations and productivity differences across countries. The
main data source is Restuccia et al. [2008]. Mean farm size is calculated
from World Census of Agriculture (round 1990) published by Food and
Agriculture Organization. The exercise proceeds as follows. All countries
are identical except for their level of TFP (A) and land endowment (L¯). In
particular, they all face the same ex-ante distribution of skills types. Next
I describe how I infer (A, L¯) for each country. To compute TFP for country
i, I exploit the linear technology in nonagriculture, which implies that TFP
is the same as output per worker in the nonagriculture sector, the latter is
directly available. Thus I compute TFP of country i, Ai, as follows
Ai =
ynlni
ynlnus
ynlni = Nonagriculture GDP per worker of country i
6See Figure 6 in appendix. Three different shares are computed using raw head count,
adjusted for working days, and using expenditure data, respectively.
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Land endowment is approximated by land-employment ratio, which is di-
rectly available as well. Recall that I calibrated L¯ for the U.S. to match size
distribution of farms, I thus compute the land endowment for country i, L¯i,
as follows
L¯i =
ELRi
ELRus
· L¯us
ELRi = Employment-land ratio of country i
The model, when fed with exogenous TFP and land endowments, pre-
dicts for each of the country the agriculture labor share (La), real output
per labor in agriculture (ryala), real GDP per worker (rgdp) and mean farm
size (mfs). Note that agriculture labor include both workers working in the
agriculture sector and farm operators. Because relative price of agriculture
output differs across countries, when computing GDP per worker I use U.S
price as the international price. To facilitate comparison between model
predictions and data, I divide countries in the sample into quintile by GDP
per worker in the data. The sample consists of 40 countries. The results are
summarized in Table 2.
Quintile rgdp ryala La mfs
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Q.1 0.13 0.19 0.04 0.04 0.66 0.48 7 16
Q.2 0.30 0.35 0.15 0.12 0.34 0.22 56 43
Q.3 0.52 0.59 0.36 0.37 0.18 0.07 83 107
Q.4 0.85 0.87 0.82 0.48 0.08 0.05 68 69
Q.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.05 515 381
Table 2: Model vs Data, by Income Quintile
The model does well in predicting productivity differences. If we compare
the bottom quintile against the top quintile, the differences in real agricul-
ture productivity in the data is 25-fold, and the model predicts differences
of the exact same magnitude. Between other low-middle income countries
and the richest countries, the model predicts about 85% of the differences
in agriculture productivity. Recall that between Q. 1 and Q.5 countries,
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the imputed differences in aggregate TFP are 5-fold, yet, the model mag-
nify the differences in agriculture productivity into 25-fold. Several forces
are at work. Nonhomothetic preferences implies higher equilibrium price
of agriculture output in low TFP countries, and thus induces more people
to become farm operators. Average skill, and hence productivity, is lower.
In addition, the equilibrium interest rate is higher in low TFP countries,
which depresses the incentive to accumulate skills. This further reduces the
average skill and decreases productivity in low income countries. Since skill
is positively correlated with scale of production, the model also generates
increasing mean farm size with income level, as observed in the data. The
model not only captures correctly secular rise of mean farm size with income
level, but also predicts the entire distribution very well for individual coun-
try. See section 4.4 in appendix for model predicted farm size distribution of
a set of countries. The ability of the model to capture the size distribution
provides good discipline on the central hypothesis, namely, the productivity
differences are driven by differences in skills.
The models’s other quantitative predictions are also consistent with data.
For the top quintile countries, the model correctly predicts the employment
share in agriculture. For the bottom quintile countries, the model predicts a
48% agriculture employment share, which explains about 80% of the data.
In general, model predicted agriculture employment is lower than the data
counterpart. This reflects other forces at work other than aggregate TFP
and land endowment. For example, high price of intermediate inputs, as dis-
cussed in Restuccia et al. [2008], induces farm operators to substitute labor
for modern input and thus increases agriculture employment. This model
also assumes a perfect labor market. However, in low income countries bar-
riers to sectoral labor movements are common. For example, Hukou system
in China imposes institutional restriction on immigration from rural villages
to urban cities. Given a slight under-prediction of agriculture labor share,
the model also under-predicts that differences in aggregate GDP per worker
between the richest and poorest countries. For the rest of the countries in
the sample, model predicted aggregate productivity are very close to data.
Another aspect of the model that can be checked with data is the agriculture
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share of GDP. Using data from World Development Indicator, agriculture
comprises a smaller share of total output as income rises. The model cap-
tures this correctly, although model generated agriculture shares of GDP
are uniformly higher than the data counterpart for all countries. For the
top quintile, the model predicts agriculture output comprises 10% of total
output, while in the data it is 3%. For the bottom quintile, the model
predicts the value to be 70%, while in the data is 30%. Lastly, the model
also predicts the relative price of agriculture consumption to be higher in
poor countries, which is consistent with existing studies (see, for example,
Waugh and Lagakos [2009]).
3.2 Discussion
Overall the model, despite its simple structure, performs pretty well in repro-
ducing the observed regularity in sectoral labor allocations and productivity
across countries. Moreover, the model generates size distributions of farms
that closely assembles their empirical counterpart for a large set of coun-
tries, which provides good disciplines on the avenue of skill heterogeneity as
the sources of productivity differences in agriculture. The model also has
some limitations. Firstly, calibrated share of land in agriculture production
is 40%, which is a considerably large value. Griliches [1964] estimates the
share to be around 16% for the U.S., though his estimates are for the period
round 1950. In a more recent study, Restuccia et al. [2008] uses a similar
share for land in a Cobb-Douglas technology. In addition, land endowment
is approximated by land-employment ratio, and thus ignore possible differ-
ences in the quality of land. Another issue concerns the way TFP is inferred
in the quantitative exercise. Linear technology provides an convenient way of
linking aggregate TFP to nonagriculture output per worker. This approach
assumes the frontier of the whole economy is well represented by the frontier
of productions outside agriculture. Wile this assumption is reasonable for
rich countries, it is problematic for less developed countries, where most of
the productive activity takes place in the traditional sector. In addition,
if viewed in the spirit of Waugh and Lagakos [2009], the inferred aggregate
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TFP will be inflated for less developed countries because of self election.
Only the most able people, in a comparative advantage sense, are work-
ing in the nonagriculture sector in low income countries. As a result, the
measured productivity in nonagriculture sector is higher than the aggregate
sector-neutral TFP.
The consensus in the literature establishes differences in TFP , rather
than factors of production, being the main source of income differences. In
the model, countries are different only in two dimensions: TFP and land
endowment. Which one of these two exogenous variables are mainly respon-
sible for the productivity differences? To answer the question, I perform a
series of counterfactual experiments for a sample of low income countries7.
Relative to the U.S, they have an inferred TFP 4.5 times smaller, and land
endowment 2.1 times smaller. To disentangle the relative contribution, I
change one exogenous variable at a time. Table 3 summarizes the results.
Exg. variable La ryala mfs
L¯ only 2.5% 1/2 117
A only 24% 1/22 47
Both A and L¯ 53% 1/48 13
Data 70% 1/51 3
Table 3: TFP versus Endowment (With Skill Accumulation)
The main finding conform with the current consensus. If the inferred
TFP is maintained at the U.S. level, and land endowment is reduced by
half, equilibrium labor allocation and productivity change minimally, rela-
tive to the U.S, though mean farm size drops by roughly a half. Differences
in land endowment can’t go far in explaining differences in labor allocation
and productivity. In contrast, if those countries keep their own inferred
TFP, there is a massive movement of labor into agriculture despite a higher
land endowment. Moreover, agriculture productivity drops by a factor of
23, and mean farm size drops to 33 hectares. It is clear that TFP differ-
ences are much more important in shaping the observed labor allocation and
productivity patterns. It is also interesting to note that the decomposition
7These countries are Burkina Faso, Uganda, India, Ivory Coast and Pakistan
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of TFP and land endowment is not orthogonal. If both TFP and land en-
dowment are changed simultaneously, the model predicts a 69% agriculture
labor share and a 54-fold differences in productivity, almost the same as
in the data. Again, this shows the ability of the model to quantitatively
explain labor allocation and productivity differences across countries.
An important feature of the model is skill accumulation. First, skill ac-
cumulation is critical for the model to generate a size distribution that is well
disciplined with the data. A similar idea was illustrated in Bhattacharya
[2009], who shows that skill accumulation is critical to quantitatively ex-
plain cross-country variation in firm size distribution and income, using a
dynamic version of Lucas’ span-of-control model. While in that paper the
main channel of variation is coming from resources input in skill accumula-
tion, in this model the main mechanism operators through nonhomothetic
preferences. How much is skill accumulation contributing to the differences
in labor allocation and productivity? To answer this question, I consider a
variation of the model without skill accumulation, the environment is other-
wise identical to the one described in section 2. Without skill accumulation,
the problem is static. Individuals choose occupation, given skill type, that
maximizes income. I calibrate the model to the U.S economy. However,
as discussed before, without skill accumulation, it is impossible to calibrate
the model to match the entire size distribution of farms. Instead, I choose
type distribution parameters to target the first two moments of the size
distribution. I choose preferences parameter to target current agriculture
employment share and long run agriculture employment share. With the
calibrated model without skill accumulation, I perform a similar counterfac-
tual to see how much the model can explain the observed labor allocation
and productivity differences between the set of poor countries and bench-
mark, which is U.S.. Specifically, I feed into the model a 4.5-fold differences
in TFP and a 2.1-fold differences in land endowment, and compare model
implications to data. Results are summarized in Table 4.
Without skill investment, the model performs less well in predicting the
labor allocations and productivity differences. As in the case with skill in-
vestment, TFP differences are the main source of productivity differences.
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Exg. variable La ryala mfs
L¯ only 3.3% 1/1.6 65
A only 26% 1/16 20
Both A and L¯ 48% 1/28 6
Data 70% 1/51 3
Table 4: TFP versus Endowment (No Skill Accumulation)
In the quantitative exercises, economies differ only in TFP and land en-
dowment. This contrasts previous studies that explore distortions as the
underlying sources of income differences. One important distortion is the
distortion in intermediate inputs in agriculture production. From U.S agri-
culture census data, a large share (40%) of production expenses in agricul-
ture are spent on intermediate inputs. In addition, Restuccia et al. [2008]
document much higher price of intermediate inputs in less developed coun-
tries, and show that theses barriers to intermediate inputs are quantitatively
important to agriculture productivity differences across countries. In this
section, I explore the important of distortions in intermediate inputs within
the model with skill heterogeneity. More specifically, I augment the agricul-
ture technology to allow for intermediate input (X), i.e.,
Ya = A · z
1−γ
(
Xφ ·Hρa · L
1−φ−ρ
)γ
Intermediate good X is produced in the nonagriculture sector. More
specifically, one unit of nonagriculture output can either be consumed or
converted into intermediate good at the rate of pi. The resources constraint
in the nonagriculture sector is given by
Cn + pi ·X = Yn
in equilibrium, pi is the relative price of intermediate good to nonagriculture
good. The economy is otherwise identical to the one described in section 2
except that I abstract from skill investment. The reason is to disentangle the
effects coming from distortions from those stemming from skill investment.
I calibrate the model to the U.S. I set γ = 0.8, and φ = 0.5 to target the
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share of intermediate input in agriculture output. To target a land share
of 16%, I let ρ = 0.3. For the U.S, price of intermediate pi is normalized
at unity. I then (η, ,¯µ, σ) to target a 2% current agriculture employment,
0.5% long run agriculture employment, 2% share of agriculture output of
GDP, and the mean farm size. Within the sample, the poorest countries
on average have 2.5 times higher price of intermediate inputs, compared to
the U.S. As shown before, these countries also have 4.5 times lower inferred
TFP and 2.1 times smaller land endowment. I perform counterfactual to
evaluate the relative importance of each of these distortions. The results are
summarized in Table 5
Exg. variable La ryala mfs
L¯ only 2.4% 1/1.2 88
A only 29% 1/17 18
pi only 3.1% 1/1.6 135
A and L¯ 34% 1/20 7
A and pi 49% 1/28 12
pi and L¯ 3.6% 1/1.9 57
A, pi and L¯ 58% 1/33 5
Data 70% 1/51 3
Table 5: TFP versus Endowment (With Intermediate)
The main message from these counterfactuals is that distortions in inter-
mediate inputs are important, especially when coupled with TFP, in shaping
the labor allocations and agriculture productivity in less developed countries.
While it seems to natural to extend the model to incorporate both interme-
diate input and skill accumulation, it is difficult to distinguish the relative
contribution from these two components. As illustrated in the counterfac-
tual, the decomposition is not orthogonal. While Restuccia et al. [2008]
has shown convincingly that distortions in intermediate are essential to ob-
served productivity differences, I focus on skill heterogeneity as an feasible
explanation and view this study as complementary to their study.
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4 Conclusion
This paper uses a simple general equilibrium model to quantitatively explain
high labor share, low productivity and small farm size in agriculture sector
of low income countries. I first document a set of facts regarding the scale
of production in the agriculture sector across countries using data set from
World Census of Agriculture published by Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion. Mean farm size positively correlates with income level. In addition,
agriculture production concentrates mostly in small farms in poor countries.
The main contribution of this paper is to interpret the observed farm size
heterogeneity as reflecting the differences in skills of farm operators, using
a version of Lucas’ span-of-control model. This interpretation is supported
by U.S data. Using U.S agriculture census data, I found the scale of pro-
duction exhibits a hump-shape pattern over operator’s life-cycle. Combined
together, these cross-section data on farm size suggest skill differences are
feasible explanation of differences in scale of production. Moreover, theses
skills are potentially augmentable. In this sense, skill can be regarded as a
form of human capital that is specific to agriculture production.
I develop a model that features individual heterogeneity in skills that
are augmentable over time. Individuals are ex-ante identical, but ex-post
different in terms of their occupation. Conditional on initial type, individ-
ual choose an occupation as well as skill investment to maximize discounted
lifetime income. Equilibrium is characterized by a cut-off level of initial type
such that individuals with initial type below the cut-off become worker, and
individuals with initial type above the cut-off become farm operators. The
level of cut-off type determines the measure of agriculture employment, as
well as labor productivity. High income countries have a high cut-off and
hence small agriculture employment and high labor productivity. Low in-
come countries have low cut-off and hence large agriculture employment
and low labor productivity. The model is calibrated to the U.S. to match
some key moments as well as the size distribution of farms. Then I test
the model’s predictive ability for a sample of 48 countries. Countries have
different aggregate sector-neutral TFP and land endowment, and are other-
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wise identical. The model predicts successfully the differences in agriculture
productivity, and about 80% of the variation in labor allocation and produc-
tivity between richest and the poorest countries. The model also generates
agriculture share of GDP and relative price of agriculture consumption that
are consistent with data. In addition, for a large set of countries, the model
generates an endogenous farm size distribution that closely assemble its
empirical counterpart. A series of counterfactual within the model also con-
forms with the consensus in the economic development literature, namely,
TFP differences, rather than differences in factors of production, are the
main sources of income differences.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 It is useful to first derive the profit function, where
Π(z) = maxh,` py − wh− ql. Using F.O.C, it is easy to show that
pi(z) =p˜i · z
where p˜i = (1− γ) · (P ·A)
1
1−γ
(
γ
(α
w
)α(1− α
q
)1−α) γ1−γ
Profit function is thus linear in ability z. In a stationary equilibrium, prices
are constant over time. This implies constant profit per unit of skill. Thus
farm operator’s problem can be written as one that maximizes the sum of
discounted lifetime skill.
max
st
:
t=T∑
t=1
R1−tt · zt · (1− st)
s.t : zt+1 = zt(1 + s
θ
t )
Let λt be the Lagrangian multiplier for period t
L =
T∑
t=1
R1−t · zt · (1− st)− λt(zt+1 − zt(1 + s
θ
t ))
F.O.Cs are
R1−t = λtθs
θ−1
t (8)
λt = R
−t(1− st+1) + λt+1(1− δt + s
θ
t ) (9)
From equation(9), if λt+1 is independent of beginning of period skill zt, then
(λt) does not depend on zt. Consequently the equation (8) the optimal time
investment st does not depend on zt as well. To solve the optimal path, I use
backward induction. Clearly, it is optimal to invest no time in the last period,
sT = 0, λT = 0, and hence independent of zT−1. Using the above argument,
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λT−1 and sT−1 does not depend on zT−1. Repeating this argument implies
that the entire path of investment is independent of initial skill type.
Proof of Lemma 2 Life time budget constraint can be written as
T∑
t=1
pcat + cnt
Rt−1
≤ Y
where Y is the discounted lifetime income. The Lagrangian is
L =
∑
βt(ηlog(cat − a¯) + (1− η)log(cnt))− λ
[∑ pcat + cnt
Rt−1
− Y
]
F.O.C yields
βtη
cat − a¯
= λ
p
Rt−1
(10)
βt(1− η)
cnt
= λ
1
Rt−1
(11)
(1) divided by (2) yields the intratemporal allocation between two con-
sumption goods as
p(cat − a¯)
cnt
=
η
1− η
. (12)
Iterating (1) and (2) one more period yields the usual intertemporal alloca-
tions
(ca,t+1 − a¯) = βR(cat − a¯) (13)
cn,t+1 = βRcnt (14)
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Substitute F.O.C into budget constraints we have
T∑
t=1
p
[
·(ca1 − a¯) · (βR)
t−1 + a¯
]
+ (βR)t−1 · cn1
Rt−1
= Y
→p · (ca1 − a¯) + cn1 =
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
→ca1 = η ·
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
/p+ a¯
cn1 = (1− η) ·
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
Aggregate consumption at a point of time is given by
Ca =
T∑
t=1
cat =
[
T∑
t=1
(βR)t−1
]
·
[
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
]
·
η
p
+ T · a¯
Cn =
T∑
t=1
cat =
[
T∑
t=1
(βR)t−1
]
·
[
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
]
· (1− η)
5.2 Development Accounting Exercise
To simply the calculation, I assume that all farms in size class [sl, sh] have
the same size (sl+sh)/2. Let si denote the mean farm size, and µi denote the
corresponding share in class i. In addition, let yi and hi denote, respectively,
the output and labor. Using U.S. data, I estimate the following equations
log ((y/h)i) = b1 + b2 · log(si)
log ((hl)i) = c1 + c2 · log(si)
Note that yi is measured by the total market sales of goods net of govern-
ment payments, and hi is measured by the sum of farm operators and hired
workers. The methodology in U.S. agriculture census assumes one farm op-
erator per farm. Let ni note the number of farms report hired labor, and
let hli denote the number of hired labor, the total number of worker in size
class i is simply ni + hli. For 2007, the estimated coefficients are (b1, b2)
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= (-0.916,0.548) and the R2 is 93% for the first regression. For the second
regression, the estimated coefficients are (c1, c2) = (1.62, 0.058) and the R2
is 72%. Given size distribution µi over size class, then aggregate output per
worker is computed as
Y =
∑
i
[(b1 + b2 · log(si)) · hi · µi]
hi =
(c1 + c2 · log(si)) · µi + µi∑
i [(c1 + c2 · log(si)) · µi + µi]
where the second equation gives the distribution of workers over size classes.
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5.3 Occupation Choice Illustration
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Figure 3: Illustration of Equilibrium Occupation Choice
5.4 Estimating Return to Scale Parameters in Agriculture
The main data sources is Value Added report published by USDA for the
farming sector. The data set presents a detail account of farming produc-
tion and expenses at the aggregate level. In principle, Total output(YA), is
the summation of crop production, livestock production and revenues from
services and forestry. Total output, net of government transfers, are fully
dissipated into the following factors of production: intermediate inputs, cap-
ital, labor, land and operators. In the data, these components corresponds
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to Purchased Inputs (PI), Capital Consumption plus Real Estate and Non
Real Estate Interest (CCI), Compensation to Hired Labor (CHL), Net Rent
Received by Non-operator Landlord (RL) and Net Farm Income (NFI), i.e.,
Y A = PI + CCI +CHL+RL+NFI
Here I implicitly assume that real estate and non real estate interest income
are capital income because structures are typically considered as a compo-
nent of capital. Net farm income represents “ entrepreneurial earnings of
those individuals who share in the risks of production and materially par-
ticipate in the operation of the business”, and thus captures the return to
skills provided by farm operator. I obtained aggregate level data for the
U.S. from 1980-1999. The estimated income shares are summarized in the
following table.
1985 1980-1990 1990-1999 1980-1999
Intermediate 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.49
Capital 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.20
Labor 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06
Land 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
Operator 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.20
Table 6: Factor Shares in U.S. Farming
5.5 Working Days by Operator Age
From 1992 census of agriculture, I extract the number of days not working
on the farm for farm operators by age. Table 7 summarizes the data.
To compute the the hours supplied by operator of a certain age, I assume
250 working days a year. In addition, I use the midpoint of the interval
as the average days off farm. For example, “None” in the table means
operators work 250 days a year. Operators work 200 days if in interval “
1-99 days”, 150 working days if in interval “100-199 days”, and 25 working
days if in interval “200 days+”. This allows me to compute the total number
of working days a year for operators in any age category. Finally, I compute
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25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Total
Days/Operator 94,932 178,809 183,206 236,016 344,159 1,037,122
None 52,938 104,375 110,380 158,629 249,512 675,834
1-99 days 18,015 29,804 25,428 27,061 19,267 119,575
100-199 days 7,872 14,648 14,308 12,423 6,169 55,420
200 days + 10,028 15,565 14,681 11,082 5,087 56,443
Table 7: Days off Farm by Age of Operator
the share of days supplied by operators in age group i, denoted by si, as
si =
wdi∑I
i=1 wdi
where wdi is the number of working days for operators in age group i.
The implied shares are given below
Age 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Work Days (1000s) 17875 33908 34478 46589 66975
Share 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.34
5.6 Parameter Values
η a¯ θ L¯ µ σ
0.015 0.221 0.3157 0.7842 -3.1236 4.1693
Table 8: Parameter Values
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Figure 4: Calibrated Size Distribution
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Figure 5: Implied Distribution of Land
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Figure 6: Implied Distribution of Hired Labor
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Age Data Model
25-34 0.1 0.08
35-44 0.16 0.16
45-54 0.17 0.21
55-64 0.23 0.26
65+ 0.34 0.29
Table 9: Time Share by Age of Operator
5.7 Model Performances
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Figure 7: Model Prediction Against Data
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5.8 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution (Q.1)
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5.9 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution (Q.2)
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5.10 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution (Q.3)
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5.11 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution (Q.4)
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5.12 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution (Q.5)
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